A Coalitional Algorithm for Recursive Delegation

Juan Afanador Leon, Nir Oren

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Within multi-agent systems, some agents may delegate tasks to other agents for execution. Recursive delegation designates situations where delegated tasks may, in turn, be delegated onwards. In unconstrained environments, recursive delegation policies based on quitting games are known to outperform policies based on multi-armed bandits. In this work, we incorporate allocation rules and rewarding schemes when considering recursive delegation, and reinterpret the quitting-game approach in terms of coalitions, employing the Shapley and Myerson values to guide delegation decisions. We empirically evaluate our extensions and demonstrate that they outperform the traditional multi-armed bandit based approach, while offering a resource efficient alternative to the quitting game heuristic.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of PRIMA 2019
PublisherSpringer
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 28 Aug 2019
EventThe 22nd International Conference
on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA2019)
- Torino, Italy
Duration: 28 Oct 201931 Oct 2019

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Conference

ConferenceThe 22nd International Conference
on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA2019)
Abbreviated titlePRIMA2019
CountryItaly
CityTorino
Period28/10/1931/10/19

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Multi agent systems

Cite this

Afanador Leon, J., & Oren, N. (Accepted/In press). A Coalitional Algorithm for Recursive Delegation. In Proceedings of PRIMA 2019 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Springer .

A Coalitional Algorithm for Recursive Delegation. / Afanador Leon, Juan; Oren, Nir.

Proceedings of PRIMA 2019. Springer , 2019. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Afanador Leon, J & Oren, N 2019, A Coalitional Algorithm for Recursive Delegation. in Proceedings of PRIMA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer , The 22nd International Conference
on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA2019), Torino, Italy, 28/10/19.
Afanador Leon J, Oren N. A Coalitional Algorithm for Recursive Delegation. In Proceedings of PRIMA 2019. Springer . 2019. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
Afanador Leon, Juan ; Oren, Nir. / A Coalitional Algorithm for Recursive Delegation. Proceedings of PRIMA 2019. Springer , 2019. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
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