A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks

Malcolm Egan, Martin Schaefer*, Michal Jakob, Nir Oren

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingPublished conference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber, and Liftago in Prague. These services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago’s approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfy key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings
EditorsQ Chen, P Torroni, S Villata, J Hsu, A Omicini
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages557-565
Number of pages9
Volume9387
ISBN (Print)9783319255231, 9783319255231
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Event18th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2015 - Bertinoro, Italy
Duration: 26 Oct 201530 Oct 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9387
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Conference

Conference18th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2015
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityBertinoro
Period26/10/1530/10/15

Keywords

  • Double auction
  • On-demand transport
  • Taxis

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