A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks

Malcolm Egan, Martin Schaefer*, Michal Jakob, Nir Oren

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber, and Liftago in Prague. These services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago’s approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfy key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings
EditorsQ Chen, P Torroni, S Villata, J Hsu, A Omicini
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages557-565
Number of pages9
Volume9387
ISBN (Print)9783319255231, 9783319255231
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Event18th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2015 - Bertinoro, Italy
Duration: 26 Oct 201530 Oct 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9387
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Conference

Conference18th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2015
CountryItaly
CityBertinoro
Period26/10/1530/10/15

Fingerprint

Double Auction
Costs
Pricing
Driver
Demand
Range of data

Keywords

  • Double auction
  • On-demand transport
  • Taxis

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Egan, M., Schaefer, M., Jakob, M., & Oren, N. (2015). A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks. In Q. Chen, P. Torroni, S. Villata, J. Hsu, & A. Omicini (Eds.), PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings (Vol. 9387, pp. 557-565). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9387). Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38

A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks. / Egan, Malcolm; Schaefer, Martin; Jakob, Michal; Oren, Nir.

PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings. ed. / Q Chen; P Torroni; S Villata; J Hsu; A Omicini. Vol. 9387 Springer-Verlag, 2015. p. 557-565 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9387).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Egan, M, Schaefer, M, Jakob, M & Oren, N 2015, A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks. in Q Chen, P Torroni, S Villata, J Hsu & A Omicini (eds), PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings. vol. 9387, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9387, Springer-Verlag, pp. 557-565, 18th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2015, Bertinoro, Italy, 26/10/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38
Egan M, Schaefer M, Jakob M, Oren N. A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks. In Chen Q, Torroni P, Villata S, Hsu J, Omicini A, editors, PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings. Vol. 9387. Springer-Verlag. 2015. p. 557-565. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38
Egan, Malcolm ; Schaefer, Martin ; Jakob, Michal ; Oren, Nir. / A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks. PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings. editor / Q Chen ; P Torroni ; S Villata ; J Hsu ; A Omicini. Vol. 9387 Springer-Verlag, 2015. pp. 557-565 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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