@inproceedings{0b6622d57b5246c18847137fe1d70af4,
title = "A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks",
abstract = "Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber, and Liftago in Prague. These services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago{\textquoteright}s approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfy key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.",
keywords = "Double auction, On-demand transport, Taxis",
author = "Malcolm Egan and Martin Schaefer and Michal Jakob and Nir Oren",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319255231",
volume = "9387",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag",
pages = "557--565",
editor = "Q Chen and P Torroni and S Villata and J Hsu and A Omicini",
booktitle = "PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 18th International Conference, Proceedings",
note = "18th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2015 ; Conference date: 26-10-2015 Through 30-10-2015",
}