A simple argumentation based contract enforcement mechanism

Nir Oren, Alun Preece, Timothy J. Norman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Agents may choose to ignore contract violations if the costs of enforcing the contract exceed the compensation they would receive. In this paper we provide an argumentation based framework for agents to both decide whether to enforce a contract, and to undertake contract enforcement actions. The framework centers around the agent reasoning about what arguments to put forth based on a comparison between the utility it would gain for proving its case and the utility it loses for probing environment state.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Tenth International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents
EditorsMatthias Klusch, Michael Rovatsos, Terry R. Payne
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages347-359
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)3-540-38569-X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Volume4149

Keywords

  • design
  • logic

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