A thick realist consequence of Wright’s minimalism

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Abstract

According to Wright's minimalism, a notion of truth neutral with respect to realism and antirealism can be built out of the notion of warranted assertibility and a set of a priori platitudes among which the Equivalence Schema has a prominent role. Wright believes that the debate about realism and antirealism will be properly and fruitfully developed if both parties accept the conceptual framework of minimalism. In this paper, I show that this conceptual framework commits the minimalist to the realist thesis that there are mind-independent propositions; with the consequence that minimalism is not neutral to realism and antirealism. I suggest that Wright could avert this conclusion if he rejected the customary interpretation of the Equivalence Schema according to which this Schema applies to propositions. This would however render minimalism unpalatable to philosophers who welcome the traditional reading of the Equivalence Schema and believe that propositions are bearers of truth.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)24-38
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume88
Issue number1
Early online date20 Feb 2007
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2007

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A thick realist consequence of Wright’s minimalism. / Moretti, Luca.

In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 1, 03.2007, p. 24-38.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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