About Oneself

De Se Thought and Communication

Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (Editor), Stephan Torre (Editor)

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Abstract

This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se, thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the questions addressed is whether there is anything distinctive about first-person thought or whether it can be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that first-person thought motivates a revision of traditional accounts of content or motivates positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being 'presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.' However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there indeed something special about first-person thought such that it requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by others? If there really is something special about first-person thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages368
ISBN (Print)9780198713265
Publication statusPublished - 7 Jan 2016

Fingerprint

Thought
First Person
Communication
De Se
Gottlob Frege
Mode of Presentation

Cite this

Garcia-Carpintero, M., & Torre, S. (Eds.) (2016). About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.

About Oneself : De Se Thought and Communication. / Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Editor); Torre, Stephan (Editor).

Oxford University Press, 2016. 368 p.

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Garcia-Carpintero, M & Torre, S (eds) 2016, About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.
Garcia-Carpintero M, (ed.), Torre S, (ed.). About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press, 2016. 368 p.
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (Editor) ; Torre, Stephan (Editor). / About Oneself : De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press, 2016. 368 p.
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