Absolute contradiction, dialetheism, and revenge

Is there a notion of contradiction – let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute” – making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits: first, it gives us a foot- hold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has an operator allowing it, against the opinion of many critics, to rule things out and manifest disagreement: for unlike other proposed exclusion-expressing-devices (for instance, the entail- ment of triviality), the operator used to formulate the notion of absolute contradiction appears to be immune both from crippling expressive limi- tations and from revenge paradoxes – pending a rigorous non-triviality proof for a formal dialetheic theory including it.