Activity-based funding for National Health Service hospitals in England

managers' experience and expectations

Jonathan Sussex, Shelley Farrar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Activity-based funding of hospital services has been introduced progressively since 2003 in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, under the name 'Payment by Results' (PbR). It represents a major change from previous funding arrangements based on annual "block" payments for large bundles of services. We interviewed senior local NHS managers about their experience and expectations of the impact of PbR. A high degree of 'NHS solidarity' was apparent, and competition between NHS hospitals was muted. PbR has been introduced against a background of numerous other efficiency incentives, and managers did not detect a further PbR-specific boost to efficiency. No impact on care quality, either positive or negative, is yet evident.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-206
Number of pages10
JournalEuropean Journal of Health Economics
Volume10
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2009

Keywords

  • funding
  • hospitals
  • impact
  • policy

Cite this

Activity-based funding for National Health Service hospitals in England : managers' experience and expectations. / Sussex, Jonathan; Farrar, Shelley.

In: European Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, 05.2009, p. 197-206.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{58793ae4c05d4f89903f67d6f688daed,
title = "Activity-based funding for National Health Service hospitals in England: managers' experience and expectations",
abstract = "Activity-based funding of hospital services has been introduced progressively since 2003 in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, under the name 'Payment by Results' (PbR). It represents a major change from previous funding arrangements based on annual {"}block{"} payments for large bundles of services. We interviewed senior local NHS managers about their experience and expectations of the impact of PbR. A high degree of 'NHS solidarity' was apparent, and competition between NHS hospitals was muted. PbR has been introduced against a background of numerous other efficiency incentives, and managers did not detect a further PbR-specific boost to efficiency. No impact on care quality, either positive or negative, is yet evident.",
keywords = "funding, hospitals, impact, policy",
author = "Jonathan Sussex and Shelley Farrar",
year = "2009",
month = "5",
doi = "10.1007/s10198-008-0119-0",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
pages = "197--206",
journal = "European Journal of Health Economics",
issn = "1618-7598",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Activity-based funding for National Health Service hospitals in England

T2 - managers' experience and expectations

AU - Sussex, Jonathan

AU - Farrar, Shelley

PY - 2009/5

Y1 - 2009/5

N2 - Activity-based funding of hospital services has been introduced progressively since 2003 in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, under the name 'Payment by Results' (PbR). It represents a major change from previous funding arrangements based on annual "block" payments for large bundles of services. We interviewed senior local NHS managers about their experience and expectations of the impact of PbR. A high degree of 'NHS solidarity' was apparent, and competition between NHS hospitals was muted. PbR has been introduced against a background of numerous other efficiency incentives, and managers did not detect a further PbR-specific boost to efficiency. No impact on care quality, either positive or negative, is yet evident.

AB - Activity-based funding of hospital services has been introduced progressively since 2003 in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, under the name 'Payment by Results' (PbR). It represents a major change from previous funding arrangements based on annual "block" payments for large bundles of services. We interviewed senior local NHS managers about their experience and expectations of the impact of PbR. A high degree of 'NHS solidarity' was apparent, and competition between NHS hospitals was muted. PbR has been introduced against a background of numerous other efficiency incentives, and managers did not detect a further PbR-specific boost to efficiency. No impact on care quality, either positive or negative, is yet evident.

KW - funding

KW - hospitals

KW - impact

KW - policy

U2 - 10.1007/s10198-008-0119-0

DO - 10.1007/s10198-008-0119-0

M3 - Article

VL - 10

SP - 197

EP - 206

JO - European Journal of Health Economics

JF - European Journal of Health Economics

SN - 1618-7598

IS - 2

ER -