Analyzing the tradeoff between efficiency and cost of norm enforcement in stochastic environments

Moser Silva Fagundes, Sascha Ossowski, Felipe Meneguzzi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingPublished conference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In multiagent systems, agents might interfere with each other as a side-effect of their activities. One approach to coordinating these agents is to restrict their activities by means of social norms whose violation results in sanctions to violating agents. We formalize a normative system within a stochastic environment and norm enforcement follows a stochastic model in which stricter enforcement entails higher cost. Within this type of system, we provide an approach to analize the tradeoff between norm enforcement efficiency and its cost considering a population of norm-aware selfish agents.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationECAI 2014 - 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Subtitle of host publicationIncluding Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems, PAIS 2014
EditorsTorsten Schaub, Gerhard Friedrich, Barry O'Sullivan
PublisherIOS Press
Pages1003-1004
Number of pages2
Volume263
ISBN (Electronic)9781614994183
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Event21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014 - Prague, Czech Republic
Duration: 18 Aug 201422 Aug 2014

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Volume263
ISSN (Print)0922-6389

Conference

Conference21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014
Country/TerritoryCzech Republic
CityPrague
Period18/08/1422/08/14

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