Antirealism and the conditional fallacy

the semantic approach

Luca Moretti, Patrick Girard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)
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Abstract

The expression conditional fallacy identies a family of arguments
deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions dened in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically dened in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example
that there exists necessarily a rational enquirer. If these consequences followed from the antirealist notion of truth, alethic antirealism should probably be rejected. In this paper we analyse the conditional fallacy from a semantic (i.e. model-theoretic) point of view. This allows us to identify with precision the philosophical commitments that ground the validity of this type of arguments. We show that the conditional fallacy arguments against alethic antirealism are valid only if controversial meta-
physical assumptions are accepted. We suggest that the antirealist is not committed to the conditional fallacy because she is not committed to some of these assumptions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)761-783
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Volume43
Issue number4
Early online date24 May 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2014

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Anti-realism
Fallacies
Physical

Keywords

  • conditional fallacy
  • antirealism
  • counterfactual
  • conditional logic

Cite this

Antirealism and the conditional fallacy : the semantic approach. / Moretti, Luca; Girard, Patrick.

In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 43, No. 4, 08.2014, p. 761-783.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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