Antiscepticism and Easy Justification

Luca Moretti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


In this chapter I investigate the epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose it simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSeemings and Epistemic Justification
Subtitle of host publicationHow Appearances Justify Beliefs
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-43392-5
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-43391-8
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Philosophy
ISSN (Print)2211-4548
ISSN (Electronic)2211-4556


  • Bootstrapping
  • Easy justification
  • Phenomenal conservatism
  • Reflective awareness
  • Responses to scepticism
  • Scepticism


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