Abstract
In this chapter I investigate the epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose it simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Seemings and Epistemic Justification |
| Subtitle of host publication | How Appearances Justify Beliefs |
| Place of Publication | Cham |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media B.V. |
| Pages | 71-88 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-030-43392-5 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-3-030-43391-8 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Publication series
| Name | SpringerBriefs in Philosophy |
|---|---|
| ISSN (Print) | 2211-4548 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2211-4556 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2020, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Keywords
- Bootstrapping
- Easy justification
- Phenomenal conservatism
- Reflective awareness
- Responses to scepticism
- Scepticism