Asymmetric information, occupational choice and government policy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A model of credit markets tinder asymmetric information is proposed in which individuals differ in abilities that are valued in both entrepreneurship and paid employment. Unlike the heterogeneous ability model of de Meza and Webb (1987), over-investment is not inevitable: Under-investment and credit rationing can occur instead. This result depends on the novel possibility of there being greater separation of types in paid employment than in entrepreneurship. The model allows individuals to be monitored in both occupations, and permits derivation of the conditions under which the novel possibility holds. The role of corrective government policies is also discussed.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)861-882
Number of pages22
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume113
Issue number490
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2003

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Government policy
Occupational choice
Asymmetric information
Entrepreneurship
Overinvestment
Credit rationing
Individual model
Credit markets
Underinvestment

Cite this

Asymmetric information, occupational choice and government policy. / Parker, Simon.

In: Economic Journal, Vol. 113, No. 490, 10.2003, p. 861-882.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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