Attractiveness qualifies the effect of observation on trusting behavior in an economic game

Finlay G Smith, Lisa M DeBruine, Benedict C Jones, Daniel Brian Krupp, Lisa L M Welling, Claire A Conway

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent studies show that subtle cues of observation affect cooperation even when anonymity is explicitly assured. For instance, recent studies have shown that the presence of eyes increases cooperation on social economic tasks. Here we tested the effects of cues of observation on trusting behavior in a two-player trust game and the extent to which these effects are qualified by participants' own attractiveness. Although explicit cues of being observed (i.e. when participants were informed that the other player would see their face) tended to increase trusting behavior, this effect was qualified by the participants' other-rated attractiveness (estimated from third-party ratings of face photographs). Participants' own physical attractiveness was positively correlated with the extent to which they trusted others more when they believed they could be seen than when they believed they could not be seen was. This interaction between cues of observation and own attractiveness suggests context-dependence of trusting behavior that is sensitive to whether and how others react to one's physical appearance.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)393-397
Number of pages5
JournalEvolution and Human Behavior
Volume30
Issue number6
Early online date14 Aug 2009
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2009

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economic behavior
Cues
Economics
economics
Observation
photographs
photograph
socioeconomics
eyes
effect
Attractiveness
co-operation

Keywords

  • attractiveness
  • trust
  • observation
  • economic games

Cite this

Smith, F. G., DeBruine, L. M., Jones, B. C., Krupp, D. B., Welling, L. L. M., & Conway, C. A. (2009). Attractiveness qualifies the effect of observation on trusting behavior in an economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30(6), 393-397. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.06.003

Attractiveness qualifies the effect of observation on trusting behavior in an economic game. / Smith, Finlay G; DeBruine, Lisa M; Jones, Benedict C; Krupp, Daniel Brian; Welling, Lisa L M; Conway, Claire A.

In: Evolution and Human Behavior, Vol. 30, No. 6, 11.2009, p. 393-397.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Smith, FG, DeBruine, LM, Jones, BC, Krupp, DB, Welling, LLM & Conway, CA 2009, 'Attractiveness qualifies the effect of observation on trusting behavior in an economic game', Evolution and Human Behavior, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 393-397. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.06.003
Smith, Finlay G ; DeBruine, Lisa M ; Jones, Benedict C ; Krupp, Daniel Brian ; Welling, Lisa L M ; Conway, Claire A. / Attractiveness qualifies the effect of observation on trusting behavior in an economic game. In: Evolution and Human Behavior. 2009 ; Vol. 30, No. 6. pp. 393-397.
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