Bargaining on your spouse

Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour within marriage

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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Abstract

Legal structures of divorce settlements are important in how marital division of labour impacts on divorce. They affect not only divorce welfare but also Coasean within-marriage allocations. We offer a new theoretical framework to empirically identify Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour. Whilst an increase in the spouse’s wage always reduces (increases) non-Coasean labour supply (home production), observing an increase in both types of production indicates Coasean bargaining. Observing labour supply falls after a divorce will again indicate Coasean bargaining. We give a possible explanation for why males’ preferences for stereotypical work division and the females emphasise on non-monetary work aspects persist.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUniversity of Aberdeen Business School
Number of pages27
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2015

Publication series

NameDiscussion Paper in Economics
PublisherUniversity of Aberdeen
No.2
Volume15
ISSN (Electronic)0143-4543

Fingerprint

Marriage
Spouses
Divorce
Labor supply
Home production
Division of labor
Theoretical framework
Wages

Keywords

  • Marriage
  • Divorce
  • Coasean Bargains
  • Non-Coasean behaviour

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Skatun, J. D. (2015). Bargaining on your spouse: Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour within marriage. (Discussion Paper in Economics; Vol. 15, No. 2). University of Aberdeen Business School.

Bargaining on your spouse : Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour within marriage. / Skatun, John Douglas.

University of Aberdeen Business School, 2015. (Discussion Paper in Economics; Vol. 15, No. 2).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Skatun, JD 2015 'Bargaining on your spouse: Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour within marriage' Discussion Paper in Economics, no. 2, vol. 15, University of Aberdeen Business School.
Skatun JD. Bargaining on your spouse: Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour within marriage. University of Aberdeen Business School. 2015 Feb. (Discussion Paper in Economics; 2).
Skatun, John Douglas. / Bargaining on your spouse : Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour within marriage. University of Aberdeen Business School, 2015. (Discussion Paper in Economics; 2).
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