Bargaining on your spouse: Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour within marriage

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Abstract

Legal structures of divorce settlements are important in how marital division of labour impacts on divorce. They affect not only divorce welfare but also Coasean within-marriage allocations. We offer a new theoretical framework to empirically identify Coasean and non-Coasean behaviour. Whilst an increase in the spouse’s wage always reduces (increases) non-Coasean labour supply (home production), observing an increase in both types of production indicates Coasean bargaining. Observing labour supply falls after a divorce will again indicate Coasean bargaining. We give a possible explanation for why males’ preferences for stereotypical work division and the females emphasise on non-monetary work aspects persist.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUniversity of Aberdeen Business School
Number of pages27
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2015

Publication series

NameDiscussion Paper in Economics
PublisherUniversity of Aberdeen
No.2
Volume15
ISSN (Electronic)0143-4543

Keywords

  • Marriage
  • Divorce
  • Coasean Bargains
  • Non-Coasean behaviour

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