Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments

Guilherme Krzisch, Nir Oren, Felipe Meneguzzi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingPublished conference contribution

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Abstract

In order to sanction non-compliant agents, norm violations must be detected, which in turn requires norm monitoring. This paper examines the problem of monitor placement within a normative multi-Agent system under budgetary constraints. More specifically we consider a system containing (1) a set of possible monitors able to determine the state of a subset of the domain; (2) costs associated with deploying the monitors; and (3) a set of norms for which compliance must be monitored, and which, if violated, result in a penalty. We seek to identify which combination of monitors maximizes the system's utility. We formalize the problem and evaluate approximate solutions using several heuristics, empirically demonstrating their efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy
Subtitle of host publicationArtificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017)
EditorsMarta Poblet, Pompeu Casanovas, Enric Plaza
PublisherCEUR-WS
Pages28-37
Number of pages10
Volume1897
Publication statusPublished - 17 Aug 2017
EventWorkshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: 19 Aug 201719 Aug 2017

Workshop

WorkshopWorkshop on Linked Democracy
Abbreviated titleLINKDEM 2017
Country/TerritoryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period19/08/1719/08/17

Bibliographical note

ISSN: 16130073

Funding: This work is partially supported by grants from CNPq/Brazil numbers 132339/2016-1 and 305969/2016-1.

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