Abstract
In order to sanction non-compliant agents, norm violations must be detected, which in turn requires norm monitoring. This paper examines the problem of monitor placement within a normative multi-Agent system under budgetary constraints. More specifically we consider a system containing (1) a set of possible monitors able to determine the state of a subset of the domain; (2) costs associated with deploying the monitors; and (3) a set of norms for which compliance must be monitored, and which, if violated, result in a penalty. We seek to identify which combination of monitors maximizes the system's utility. We formalize the problem and evaluate approximate solutions using several heuristics, empirically demonstrating their efficiency.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy |
Subtitle of host publication | Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017) |
Editors | Marta Poblet, Pompeu Casanovas, Enric Plaza |
Publisher | CEUR-WS |
Pages | 28-37 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Volume | 1897 |
Publication status | Published - 17 Aug 2017 |
Event | Workshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation - Melbourne, Australia Duration: 19 Aug 2017 → 19 Aug 2017 |
Workshop
Workshop | Workshop on Linked Democracy |
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Abbreviated title | LINKDEM 2017 |
Country/Territory | Australia |
City | Melbourne |
Period | 19/08/17 → 19/08/17 |
Bibliographical note
ISSN: 16130073Funding: This work is partially supported by grants from CNPq/Brazil numbers 132339/2016-1 and 305969/2016-1.