Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments

Guilherme Krzisch, Nir Oren, Felipe Meneguzzi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In order to sanction non-compliant agents, norm violations must be detected, which in turn requires norm monitoring. This paper examines the problem of monitor placement within a normative multi-Agent system under budgetary constraints. More specifically we consider a system containing (1) a set of possible monitors able to determine the state of a subset of the domain; (2) costs associated with deploying the monitors; and (3) a set of norms for which compliance must be monitored, and which, if violated, result in a penalty. We seek to identify which combination of monitors maximizes the system's utility. We formalize the problem and evaluate approximate solutions using several heuristics, empirically demonstrating their efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy
Subtitle of host publicationArtificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017)
EditorsMarta Poblet, Pompeu Casanovas, Enric Plaza
PublisherCEUR-WS
Pages28-37
Number of pages10
Volume1897
Publication statusPublished - 17 Aug 2017
EventWorkshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: 19 Aug 201719 Aug 2017

Workshop

WorkshopWorkshop on Linked Democracy
Abbreviated titleLINKDEM 2017
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period19/08/1719/08/17

Fingerprint

Multi agent systems
Monitoring
Costs
Compliance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Krzisch, G., Oren, N., & Meneguzzi, F. (2017). Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments. In M. Poblet, P. Casanovas, & E. Plaza (Eds.), Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017) (Vol. 1897, pp. 28-37). CEUR-WS.

Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments. / Krzisch, Guilherme; Oren, Nir; Meneguzzi, Felipe.

Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017). ed. / Marta Poblet; Pompeu Casanovas; Enric Plaza. Vol. 1897 CEUR-WS, 2017. p. 28-37.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Krzisch, G, Oren, N & Meneguzzi, F 2017, Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments. in M Poblet, P Casanovas & E Plaza (eds), Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017). vol. 1897, CEUR-WS, pp. 28-37, Workshop on Linked Democracy, Melbourne, Australia, 19/08/17.
Krzisch G, Oren N, Meneguzzi F. Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments. In Poblet M, Casanovas P, Plaza E, editors, Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017). Vol. 1897. CEUR-WS. 2017. p. 28-37
Krzisch, Guilherme ; Oren, Nir ; Meneguzzi, Felipe. / Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments. Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy: Artificial Intelligence for Democratic Innovation (LINKDEM 2017). editor / Marta Poblet ; Pompeu Casanovas ; Enric Plaza. Vol. 1897 CEUR-WS, 2017. pp. 28-37
@inproceedings{2c79d45f9f804b82b23403a7fb22fe04,
title = "Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments",
abstract = "In order to sanction non-compliant agents, norm violations must be detected, which in turn requires norm monitoring. This paper examines the problem of monitor placement within a normative multi-Agent system under budgetary constraints. More specifically we consider a system containing (1) a set of possible monitors able to determine the state of a subset of the domain; (2) costs associated with deploying the monitors; and (3) a set of norms for which compliance must be monitored, and which, if violated, result in a penalty. We seek to identify which combination of monitors maximizes the system's utility. We formalize the problem and evaluate approximate solutions using several heuristics, empirically demonstrating their efficiency.",
author = "Guilherme Krzisch and Nir Oren and Felipe Meneguzzi",
note = "ISSN: 16130073 Funding: This work is partially supported by grants from CNPq/Brazil numbers 132339/2016-1 and 305969/2016-1.",
year = "2017",
month = "8",
day = "17",
language = "English",
volume = "1897",
pages = "28--37",
editor = "Marta Poblet and Pompeu Casanovas and Enric Plaza",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy",
publisher = "CEUR-WS",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Bounded-Monitor Placement in Normative Environments

AU - Krzisch, Guilherme

AU - Oren, Nir

AU - Meneguzzi, Felipe

N1 - ISSN: 16130073 Funding: This work is partially supported by grants from CNPq/Brazil numbers 132339/2016-1 and 305969/2016-1.

PY - 2017/8/17

Y1 - 2017/8/17

N2 - In order to sanction non-compliant agents, norm violations must be detected, which in turn requires norm monitoring. This paper examines the problem of monitor placement within a normative multi-Agent system under budgetary constraints. More specifically we consider a system containing (1) a set of possible monitors able to determine the state of a subset of the domain; (2) costs associated with deploying the monitors; and (3) a set of norms for which compliance must be monitored, and which, if violated, result in a penalty. We seek to identify which combination of monitors maximizes the system's utility. We formalize the problem and evaluate approximate solutions using several heuristics, empirically demonstrating their efficiency.

AB - In order to sanction non-compliant agents, norm violations must be detected, which in turn requires norm monitoring. This paper examines the problem of monitor placement within a normative multi-Agent system under budgetary constraints. More specifically we consider a system containing (1) a set of possible monitors able to determine the state of a subset of the domain; (2) costs associated with deploying the monitors; and (3) a set of norms for which compliance must be monitored, and which, if violated, result in a penalty. We seek to identify which combination of monitors maximizes the system's utility. We formalize the problem and evaluate approximate solutions using several heuristics, empirically demonstrating their efficiency.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029213338&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

VL - 1897

SP - 28

EP - 37

BT - Proceedings of the Workshop on Linked Democracy

A2 - Poblet, Marta

A2 - Casanovas, Pompeu

A2 - Plaza, Enric

PB - CEUR-WS

ER -