Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism
resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a
conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic
agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon the
criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000,
Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a
counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reduction of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)229-246
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume140
Issue number2
Early online date20 Sep 2007
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2008

Fingerprint

Salerno
Anti-realism
Fallacies
Proceedings
American philosophical Association
Absurdity

Keywords

  • antirealism
  • conditional fallacy
  • Brogaard
  • Salerno
  • counterfactuals
  • counterpossibles
  • truth
  • epistemic truth
  • realism/antirealism debate
  • Prantinga
  • Rea
  • Wright
  • intuitionistic logic
  • intuitionistic modal logic
  • Lewis
  • semantic antirealism
  • alethic antirealism
  • combinatorialism
  • Nathan Salmon
  • Armstrong

Cite this

Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy. / Moretti, Luca.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 140, No. 2, 08.2008, p. 229-246.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{b806024592b04f25821a5c22b3de060e,
title = "Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy",
abstract = "Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealismresting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits aconditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemicagent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon thecriticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings andAddresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000,Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on acounterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reduction of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.",
keywords = "antirealism, conditional fallacy, Brogaard, Salerno, counterfactuals, counterpossibles, truth, epistemic truth, realism/antirealism debate, Prantinga, Rea, Wright, intuitionistic logic, intuitionistic modal logic, Lewis, semantic antirealism, alethic antirealism, combinatorialism, Nathan Salmon, Armstrong",
author = "Luca Moretti",
year = "2008",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-007-9139-3",
language = "English",
volume = "140",
pages = "229--246",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

AU - Moretti, Luca

PY - 2008/8

Y1 - 2008/8

N2 - Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealismresting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits aconditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemicagent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon thecriticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings andAddresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000,Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on acounterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reduction of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.

AB - Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealismresting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits aconditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemicagent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon thecriticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings andAddresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000,Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on acounterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reduction of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.

KW - antirealism

KW - conditional fallacy

KW - Brogaard

KW - Salerno

KW - counterfactuals

KW - counterpossibles

KW - truth

KW - epistemic truth

KW - realism/antirealism debate

KW - Prantinga

KW - Rea

KW - Wright

KW - intuitionistic logic

KW - intuitionistic modal logic

KW - Lewis

KW - semantic antirealism

KW - alethic antirealism

KW - combinatorialism

KW - Nathan Salmon

KW - Armstrong

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-007-9139-3

DO - 10.1007/s11098-007-9139-3

M3 - Article

VL - 140

SP - 229

EP - 246

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 2

ER -