Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism
resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a
conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic
agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon the
criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000,
Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a
counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reduction of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.