Abstract
We propose a coevolutionary game to study cooperative behavior in the presence of catastrophic phenomenon. We incorporate tolerance to elimination of individuals in network games where individuals update their strategies synchronously, and there are no birth of individuals and stochastic effects. We find that an avalanche-like death process can arise when defection strategies exist and individuals are vulnerable to deficiency of profits. Strikingly, we observe that, after such a cascading process terminates, cooperators are the sole survivors regardless of the game types and of the connection patterns among individuals as determined by the network topology. Cooperation thus becomes the optimal strategy and absolutely outperforms defection. Our results can yield insights into evolution of cooperation in the presence of catastrophic events in social and natural systems.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 035102 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics |
| Volume | 81 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2010 |
Cite this
Cascade of elimination and emergence of pure cooperation in coevolutionary games on networks. / Wang, Wen-Xu; Yang, Rui; Lai, Ying-Cheng.
In: Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 81, No. 3, 035102, 03.2010.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Cascade of elimination and emergence of pure cooperation in coevolutionary games on networks
AU - Wang, Wen-Xu
AU - Yang, Rui
AU - Lai, Ying-Cheng
PY - 2010/3
Y1 - 2010/3
N2 - We propose a coevolutionary game to study cooperative behavior in the presence of catastrophic phenomenon. We incorporate tolerance to elimination of individuals in network games where individuals update their strategies synchronously, and there are no birth of individuals and stochastic effects. We find that an avalanche-like death process can arise when defection strategies exist and individuals are vulnerable to deficiency of profits. Strikingly, we observe that, after such a cascading process terminates, cooperators are the sole survivors regardless of the game types and of the connection patterns among individuals as determined by the network topology. Cooperation thus becomes the optimal strategy and absolutely outperforms defection. Our results can yield insights into evolution of cooperation in the presence of catastrophic events in social and natural systems.
AB - We propose a coevolutionary game to study cooperative behavior in the presence of catastrophic phenomenon. We incorporate tolerance to elimination of individuals in network games where individuals update their strategies synchronously, and there are no birth of individuals and stochastic effects. We find that an avalanche-like death process can arise when defection strategies exist and individuals are vulnerable to deficiency of profits. Strikingly, we observe that, after such a cascading process terminates, cooperators are the sole survivors regardless of the game types and of the connection patterns among individuals as determined by the network topology. Cooperation thus becomes the optimal strategy and absolutely outperforms defection. Our results can yield insights into evolution of cooperation in the presence of catastrophic events in social and natural systems.
U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevE.81.035102
DO - 10.1103/PhysRevE.81.035102
M3 - Article
VL - 81
JO - Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics
JF - Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics
SN - 1539-3755
IS - 3
M1 - 035102
ER -