Centered Assertion

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97-114
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume150
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2010

Fingerprint

Possible Worlds
Entity

Keywords

  • assertion
  • content
  • centered worlds
  • self-locating

Cite this

Centered Assertion. / Torre, Stephan .

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 150, No. 1, 08.2010, p. 97-114.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Torre, Stephan . / Centered Assertion. In: Philosophical Studies. 2010 ; Vol. 150, No. 1. pp. 97-114.
@article{fde9b5bad07146fa8152936bbe9c6685,
title = "Centered Assertion",
abstract = "I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.",
keywords = "assertion, content, centered worlds, self-locating",
author = "Stephan Torre",
year = "2010",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-009-9399-1",
language = "English",
volume = "150",
pages = "97--114",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Centered Assertion

AU - Torre, Stephan

PY - 2010/8

Y1 - 2010/8

N2 - I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.

AB - I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.

KW - assertion

KW - content

KW - centered worlds

KW - self-locating

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-009-9399-1

DO - 10.1007/s11098-009-9399-1

M3 - Article

VL - 150

SP - 97

EP - 114

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 1

ER -