Cognitive Penetrability

Luca Moretti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSeemings and Epistemic Justification
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages23-56
Number of pages34
ISBN (Electronic)2211-4556
ISBN (Print)2211-4548
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Philosophy
ISSN (Print)2211-4548
ISSN (Electronic)2211-4556

Keywords

  • Cognitive penetrability
  • Inferentialism
  • Perceptual justification
  • Perceptual seemings
  • Phenomenal conservatism
  • Proper function
  • Reliabilism

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