@inbook{b23b54c6435645eabb84c4f3e9273c44,
title = "Cognitive Penetrability",
abstract = "In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn{\textquoteright}t yield substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.",
keywords = "Cognitive penetrability, Inferentialism, Perceptual justification, Perceptual seemings, Phenomenal conservatism, Proper function, Reliabilism",
author = "Luca Moretti",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5_3",
language = "English",
isbn = "2211-4548",
series = "SpringerBriefs in Philosophy",
publisher = "Springer Science and Business Media B.V.",
pages = "23--56",
booktitle = "Seemings and Epistemic Justification",
}