Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification

Christos Georgakakis, Luca Moretti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Abstract

Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable.

The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this thesis could, for instance, claim that your desire to have a tall daughter might influence your perception, so that she appears to you to be taller than she is. Although cognitive penetrability of perception is a controversial empirical hypothesis, it does not appear implausible. The possibility of its veracity has been cited in order to challenge positions that maintain that perceptual experience has inherent justifying power.

This article presents some of the most influential positions in contemporary literature about whether cognitive penetration would undermine perceptual justification and why it would or would not do so.

Some sections of this article focus on phenomenal conservatism, a popular conception of epistemic justification that more than any other has been targeted with objections that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of experience
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Publication series

NameThe Internet Encycopedia of Philosophy
ISSN (Electronic)2161-0002

Fingerprint

Epistemic Justification
Cognitive Penetrability
Perceptual Experience
Phenomenal Conservatism
Psychological
Penetration
Fundamental
Conception
Justification
Daughters

Cite this

Georgakakis, C., & Moretti, L. (2019). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification. In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (The Internet Encycopedia of Philosophy).

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification. / Georgakakis, Christos; Moretti, Luca.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019. (The Internet Encycopedia of Philosophy).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Georgakakis, C & Moretti, L 2019, Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification. in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Internet Encycopedia of Philosophy.
Georgakakis C, Moretti L. Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification. In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019. (The Internet Encycopedia of Philosophy).
Georgakakis, Christos ; Moretti, Luca. / Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019. (The Internet Encycopedia of Philosophy).
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