Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates: an Issue in Meta-Ontology

Francesco Berto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at a predicate F() made true by a and false by b. Unifiers try to put multipliers in front of a dilemma: in attempting to introduce metaphysical differences on the basis of semantic distinctions, multipliers either (a) rest on a fallacy of verbalism, entailed by a trade-off between a de dicto and a de re reading of modal claims, or (b) beg the question against unifiers by having to assume the distinction between a and b beforehand. I shall rise a tu quoque, showing that unifiers couldn't even distinguish material objects (or events) from the spatiotemporal regions they occupy unless they also resorted to linguistic distinctions. Their methodological aim to emancipate themselves from linguistic analysis in ontological businesses is therefore problematic.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
JournalMetaphysica: international journal for ontology and metaphysics
Volume14
Issue number1
Early online date1 Aug 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2013

Fingerprint

Ontological
Ontology
Entity
Begging
Linguistic Analysis
De Re
Peter Van Inwagen
Rereading
Supporters
Methodology
Material Objects
Fallacies
Leibniz Law
Import
Metaphysical
De Dicto

Keywords

  • philosophy
  • metaphysics
  • ontology

Cite this

Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates : an Issue in Meta-Ontology. / Berto, Francesco.

In: Metaphysica: international journal for ontology and metaphysics, Vol. 14, No. 1, 04.2013, p. 1-15.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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