Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument"

Crispin James Garth Wright

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In his contribution to the present volume, John McDowell proposes a distinctive kind of ‘transcendental’ argument for the disjunctive conception of experience, and renews his claim that the latter can be deployed to defuse certain kinds of sceptical doubt, responding obiter to the misgivings advanced in Wright (2002) about its credentials for the latter task. This chapter queries the putative ‘transcendental’ authority of disjunctivism, and reinforces the misgivings. It is argued that the root of sceptical doubt has less to do with a ‘highest common factor’ conception of the commonality between perceptions and illusions than with the possibility of phenomenological matching; and that scepticism can take a direct realist conception of sense experience in its stride once proper heed is given to the gap between direct awareness of a situation and the possession of warrant to believe that it obtains.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDisjunctivism
Subtitle of host publicationPerception, Action, Knowledge
EditorsAdrian Haddock , Fiona Macpherson
Place of PublicationNew York, NY, USA
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages390-404
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)0199231540, 978-0199231546
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jan 2008

Fingerprint

Transcendental Arguments
Conception
John McDowell
Misgivings
Transcendental
Warrants
Possession
Illusion
Skepticism
Common Factors
Realist
Authority
Disjunctivism

Keywords

  • disjunctivism
  • transcendental argument
  • experience
  • scepticism
  • McDowell
  • Wright
  • perception
  • direct realism
  • warrant

Cite this

Wright, C. J. G. (2008). Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument". In A. Haddock , & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (pp. 390-404). New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0018

Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument". / Wright, Crispin James Garth.

Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. ed. / Adrian Haddock ; Fiona Macpherson. New York, NY, USA : Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 390-404.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Wright, CJG 2008, Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument". in A Haddock & F Macpherson (eds), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press, New York, NY, USA, pp. 390-404. https://doi.org/DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0018
Wright CJG. Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument". In Haddock A, Macpherson F, editors, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. 2008. p. 390-404 https://doi.org/DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0018
Wright, Crispin James Garth. / Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument". Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. editor / Adrian Haddock ; Fiona Macpherson. New York, NY, USA : Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 390-404
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