Abstract
This chapter examines the rationale and the viability of pooling arrangements in coastal fisheries in Japan. It is shown that the advantages of coordination and joint operation associated with pooling are reflected in the improved performance of the pooling group. The allocation of effort between fishing locations characterized by different risks (of net damage) and productivities is much closer to optimum in the fully pooling group than in the group where the attempt to pool has largely failed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Communities and Markets in Economic Development |
| Editors | Masahiko Aoki , Yujiro Hayami |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford Univerity Press; Oxford |
| Chapter | 13 |
| Pages | 344-402 |
| Number of pages | 70 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199241019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
Bibliographical note
Thanks are due to Jan Willem Gunning (University of Amsterdam), Avner Greif(Stanford University), Jean Tirole and Georges Molins‐Ysal (University of
Toulouse), Tim Besley and Robin Burgess (London School of Economics), and
François Maniquet (University of Namur) for their useful comments on a
previous version of the paper or in the course of seminar presentations. Our
greatest debt is towards Frederic Gaspart and Jean‐Marie Baland (University of
Namur), Masahiko Aoki (Stanford University) and Jonathan Morduch (Princeton
University) who spent generous time discussing with us various points
addressed in the paper. Also, we are greatly indebted to the Fisheries
Cooperative Associations of Iwase and Shinminato for their continuous moral
and logistical support. The field work would not have been possible without the
financial assistance of CRED (University of Namur) and the Institute of
Advanced Studies, United Nations University (Tokyo).
Keywords
- community arrangements
- market failure
- Japan
- coastal fishery
- pooling