Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles

Jesper Kallestrup*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke's modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis' objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright's proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)377-386
Number of pages10
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2009


  • Conceivability
  • Counterpossibles
  • Kripke
  • Rigidity
  • The identity theory


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