Contextualism and Counter-Closure

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism-specific Gettier-style cases.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)187-199
Number of pages13
JournalDialectica
Volume66
Issue number1
Early online date30 Nov 2011
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2012

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