Abstract
I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism-specific Gettier-style cases.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 187-199 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Dialectica |
Volume | 66 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 30 Nov 2011 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2012 |