Contracting out, public policy and entrepreneurship

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Relatively little is known about the impact of public policies on the decisions of firms to contract out parts of their production, despite widespread growth in this practice. The present paper uses a simple principal-agent model to explore the effects of various public policies which affect employers' incentives to outsource by re-grading their employees as independent self-employed contractors. Minimum wages are predicted to increase contracting out, as are payroll and income taxes under several plausible conditions, including worker preferences exhibiting constant relative risk aversion.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)119-144
Number of pages26
JournalScottish Journal of Political Economy
Volume57
Issue number2
Early online date8 Mar 2010
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2010

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entrepreneurship
public policy
trade tax
minimum wage
income tax
grading
employer
incentive
employee
firm
worker
Contracting out
Entrepreneurship
Public policy
Grading
Constant relative risk aversion
Principal-agent model
Workers
Contractors
Minimum wage

Cite this

Contracting out, public policy and entrepreneurship. / Parker, Simon.

In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 57, No. 2, 05.2010, p. 119-144.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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