Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: Theory and evidence

F. Gaspart, Erika Seki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study whether a linear income sharing rule (pooling system) can achieve Pareto efficiency in a problem of joint exploitation of fishery resources. When agents are selfish, the homogeneity of individual outputs in equilibrium is a necessary condition for the efficient pooling system. When agents exhibit a preference for status (i.e. for being among the well-performing members of the group), the pooling system can be efficient even without this condition. This is because, on the one hand, relative status considerations enlarge the tolerable range of heterogeneity and, on the other hand, it generates an incentive structure that may homogenise individual output performances. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)51-77
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume51
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2003

Keywords

  • income pooling
  • collective action
  • social status
  • interpersonal comparison
  • fishery
  • cooperative production
  • PARTNERSHIPS
  • TOURNAMENTS
  • INCENTIVES
  • CONTRACTS
  • NORMS

Cite this

Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: Theory and evidence. / Gaspart, F.; Seki, Erika.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1, 05.2003, p. 51-77.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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