Corporate governance and tunneling: Empirical evidence from China

Lei Gao, Gerhard Kling

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

83 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze asset appropriation by principal shareholders in China and uncover the following relationships: (1) outsiders in the board of directors, audit without non-clean opinion, and dispersed ownership prevent operational tunneling; (2) belonging to a business group and issuing B or H share exacerbate asset appropriation. Institutional ownership does not prevent the embezzlement of assets and is endogenous, as investors select companies with good governance. Besides governance mechanisms, stock characteristics matter in that larger firms exhibit less tunneling, whereas highly leveraged firms experience the opposite. We find a decline of tunneling in 2001, which might be due to economic reforms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)591-605
Number of pages15
JournalPacific-Basin Finance Journal
Volume16
Issue number5
Early online date17 Nov 2007
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2008

Fingerprint

Corporate governance
China
Empirical evidence
Assets
Appropriation
Ownership
Investors
Economic reform
Governance mechanisms
Board of directors
Shareholders
Business groups
Institutional ownership
Audit
Outsider
Large firms

Keywords

  • Corporate governance
  • China
  • Operational tunneling

Cite this

Corporate governance and tunneling : Empirical evidence from China. / Gao, Lei; Kling, Gerhard.

In: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 11.2008, p. 591-605.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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