Abstract
I study how education affects the allocation of talent into different sectors of the economy. I focus on two forces. First, education adds to a worker's information capital and, thus, may change her self-confidence. Second, performance contracts give a worker incentives to choose a sector according to her abilities. The baseline model predicts that workers with intermediate ability educate, while the most able skip education. In an extension, I compare the U. K. and the U. S. bachelor's degrees and, moreover, discuss hybrid educational systems, common in Europe, that offer both U. K. and U. S. types of bachelor's degrees.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 945-976 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Journal Of Labor Economics |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2003 |
Keywords
- MARKET
- OVERCONFIDENCE
- GROWTH
- CAREER
Cite this
Education and the Allocation of Talent. / Hvide, Hans Krogh.
In: Journal Of Labor Economics, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2003, p. 945-976.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Education and the Allocation of Talent
AU - Hvide, Hans Krogh
PY - 2003
Y1 - 2003
N2 - I study how education affects the allocation of talent into different sectors of the economy. I focus on two forces. First, education adds to a worker's information capital and, thus, may change her self-confidence. Second, performance contracts give a worker incentives to choose a sector according to her abilities. The baseline model predicts that workers with intermediate ability educate, while the most able skip education. In an extension, I compare the U. K. and the U. S. bachelor's degrees and, moreover, discuss hybrid educational systems, common in Europe, that offer both U. K. and U. S. types of bachelor's degrees.
AB - I study how education affects the allocation of talent into different sectors of the economy. I focus on two forces. First, education adds to a worker's information capital and, thus, may change her self-confidence. Second, performance contracts give a worker incentives to choose a sector according to her abilities. The baseline model predicts that workers with intermediate ability educate, while the most able skip education. In an extension, I compare the U. K. and the U. S. bachelor's degrees and, moreover, discuss hybrid educational systems, common in Europe, that offer both U. K. and U. S. types of bachelor's degrees.
KW - MARKET
KW - OVERCONFIDENCE
KW - GROWTH
KW - CAREER
U2 - 10.1086/377028
DO - 10.1086/377028
M3 - Article
VL - 21
SP - 945
EP - 976
JO - Journal Of Labor Economics
JF - Journal Of Labor Economics
SN - 0734-306X
IS - 4
ER -