Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence

Erika Seki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave noncooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand preemption. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)106-135
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Development Economics
Volume80
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2006

Keywords

  • price discrimination
  • durable goods
  • alternating duopoly
  • rotation
  • fisheries
  • dynamic oligopoly
  • social norms
  • competition
  • games

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