Abstract
This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave noncooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand preemption. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 106-135 |
Number of pages | 29 |
Journal | Journal of Development Economics |
Volume | 80 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2006 |
Keywords
- price discrimination
- durable goods
- alternating duopoly
- rotation
- fisheries
- dynamic oligopoly
- social norms
- competition
- games