This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave non-cooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand pre-emption.
|Publisher||Centre for European Labour Market Research|
|Number of pages||52|
|Publication status||Published - Oct 2004|
|Name||University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series|
Seki, E. (2004). Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; Vol. 2004, No. 07). Centre for European Labour Market Research.