Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence.

Erika Seki

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave non-cooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand pre-emption.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherCentre for European Labour Market Research
Number of pages52
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2004

Publication series

NameUniversity of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series
No.07
Volume2004
ISSN (Print)0143-4543

Fingerprint

Durability
Price discrimination
Fishing
Duopoly
Economics
Rent
Economic environment
Institutional arrangements
Monopolist
Preemption

Cite this

Seki, E. (2004). Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; Vol. 2004, No. 07). Centre for European Labour Market Research.

Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence. / Seki, Erika.

Centre for European Labour Market Research, 2004. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; Vol. 2004, No. 07).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Seki, E 2004 'Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence.' University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series, no. 07, vol. 2004, Centre for European Labour Market Research.
Seki E. Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence. Centre for European Labour Market Research. 2004 Oct. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; 07).
Seki, Erika. / Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence. Centre for European Labour Market Research, 2004. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; 07).
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