Emerging firms and the allocation of control rights

A Bayesian approach

Sharon A Alvarez, Simon C Parker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

40 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper suggests that founders often use firm formation to exploit opportunities and must sometimes make organizing decisions about the allocation of control before the economic value of the opportunity can reliably be known even probabilistically. Motivated by questions surroundings such settings, we use incomplete contract theory and apply a Bayesian learning model to the allocation process of ownership control rights of founders in emerging firms. This model examines how founders learn and build on their prior beliefs, enabling them to allocate and change ownership control rights under differing conditions of risk and uncertainty.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)209-227
Number of pages19
JournalAcademy of Management Review
Volume34
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2009

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Economics
Bayesian approach
Control rights
Bayesian learning
Risk and uncertainty
Ownership
Incomplete contracts
Economic value
Firm formation
Contract theory
Learning model
Ownership change
Organizing
Uncertainty

Cite this

Emerging firms and the allocation of control rights : A Bayesian approach. / Alvarez, Sharon A; Parker, Simon C.

In: Academy of Management Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, 01.04.2009, p. 209-227.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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