Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul)1

Herman Cappelen* (Corresponding Author), Josh Dever

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In her very interesting ‘First-personal modes of presentation and the problem of empathy’ (2017, 315–336), L. A. Paul argues that the phenomenon of empathy gives us reason to care about the first person point of view: that as theorists we can only understand, and as humans only evince, empathy by appealing to that point of view. We are skeptics about the importance of the first person point of view, although not about empathy. The goal of this paper is to see if we can account for empathy without the ideology of the first person. We conclude that we can.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)315-336
Number of pages22
JournalInquiry (United Kingdom)
Volume60
Issue number3
Early online date9 Dec 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Fingerprint

First Person
Empathy
Theorists
Mode of Presentation
Ideology
Skeptics

Keywords

  • de se
  • Empathy
  • first person perspective
  • tranformative experience

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health Policy

Cite this

Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul)1. / Cappelen, Herman (Corresponding Author); Dever, Josh.

In: Inquiry (United Kingdom), Vol. 60, No. 3, 2017, p. 315-336.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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