Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism

Luca Moretti (Corresponding Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Crispin Wright maintains that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this fact doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi’s argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright cannot answer Moruzzi’s challenge without endangering his epistemology of perception.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages11
JournalEpisteme
Early online date28 Aug 2019
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 28 Aug 2019

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Skepticism
Justification
Entitlement
Crispin Wright
Negation
Epistemology
Probabilistic Reasoning

Keywords

  • epistemic entitlement
  • epistemic risk
  • perceptual justification
  • scepticism
  • Crispin Wright
  • Roger White
  • Duncan Pritchard
  • Epistemic entitlement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism. / Moretti, Luca (Corresponding Author).

In: Episteme, 28.08.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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