Abstract
This paper investigates serial crowdfunders' performance over successive campaigns. Adopting an expected utility maximization framework in a setting with asymmetric information about hidden entrepreneurial actions and types, we propose that crowdfunding amounts raised will follow a cyclical pattern over successive campaigns. A sample drawn from the population of serial crowdfunders on Kickstarter confirms this prediction and suggests that signaling reputations via the cyclical adjustment of campaign effort may be the mechanism driving it. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Article number | 106124 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Business Venturing |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 17 Apr 2021 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2021 |
Keywords
- Serial crowdfunding
- Finance
- Funds raised
- Dynamic panel data