Explaining serial crowdfunders' dynamic fundraising performance

Ahmed Sewaid, Simon C. Parker*, Abdulkader Kaakeh

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper investigates serial crowdfunders' performance over successive campaigns. Adopting an expected utility maximization framework in a setting with asymmetric information about hidden entrepreneurial actions and types, we propose that crowdfunding amounts raised will follow a cyclical pattern over successive campaigns. A sample drawn from the population of serial crowdfunders on Kickstarter confirms this prediction and suggests that signaling reputations via the cyclical adjustment of campaign effort may be the mechanism driving it. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Article number106124
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Business Venturing
Volume36
Issue number4
Early online date17 Apr 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2021

Keywords

  • Serial crowdfunding
  • Finance
  • Funds raised
  • Dynamic panel data

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