Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino

Carl Baker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn's moral expressivism cannot account for the role of moral dilemmas in ethical reasoning. Since the logic of attitudes (LA) is based on the principle of avoiding inconsistency, it must rule out as invalid any inference involving a dilemma. Marino argues that this conclusion is unacceptable, but in my paper I argue that this result is, in fact, a desirable one for LA. I contend that there are reasons for LA to exclude inferences involving dilemmas. I also contest Marino's supplementary argument that LA makes an illicit distinction between 'contingent' and 'logical' moral dilemmas.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)445-455
Number of pages11
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Volume14
Issue number4
Early online date14 Dec 2010
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2011

Keywords

  • Blackburn
  • expressivism
  • consistency
  • moral dilemmas
  • Frege-Geach problem

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