Family Firms and the "Willing Successor" Problem

Simon C. Parker*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

47 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Many family business owners want their offspring to continue the family business after they have retired. However, they may lack willing successors. Drawing on resource-based logic, this paper proposes parental business strategies which enhance the attractiveness of continuation by offspring. These strategies include investment in intangible capital, which is less valuable if offspring sell the firm, and high levels of parental effort. As a by-product, these strategies enhance the financial performance and longevity of those family firms which adopt them, and might help explain the global prevalence of family firms as an organizational form.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1241-1259
Number of pages19
JournalEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice
Volume40
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2016
EventTheories of Family Enterprise Conference - Fort Worth
Duration: 1 Jan 20151 Jan 2015

Bibliographical note

I am grateful to Jay Barney, Jess Chua, Bill Hesterly, Gurupdesh Pandher, Pierre Morrissette, Bill Schulze, Todd Zenger, and other seminar participants at Texas Christian University, the University of Utah, Ivey and the University of Windsor for helpful comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to special issue editor Jim Chrisman for constructive comments which have greatly improved earlier versions of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.

Keywords

  • COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
  • BUSINESS SUCCESSION
  • PARENTAL ALTRUISM
  • PERFORMANCE
  • OWNERSHIP
  • RESOURCE
  • ORGANIZATIONS
  • CONSEQUENCES
  • GOVERNANCE
  • INERTIA

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