Gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information

Samreen Malik* (Corresponding Author), Benedikt Mihm, Maximilian Mihm, Florian Timme

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We conduct an experiment on gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information. Based on Abreu and Gul (2000), we introduce asymmetric information about commitments by inducing irrational types, who never back down from a fixed bargaining position. Bargaining behavior depends on whether gender is revealed or not. When gender is unknown, men are more likely to mimic irrational types than women, but this gender gap is eliminated when gender is known. Male-male pairs also experience longer delays than other pairs, but only when gender is revealed and only in pairs where one subject mimics the irrational type.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102415
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Psychology
Volume86
Early online date10 Jul 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2021

Keywords

  • bargaining
  • gender
  • asymmetric information
  • strategic posture

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