Helping others or helping oneself?

International subsidies and the provision of global public goods

Ramses H. Abul Naga, Philip Jones

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper explores the welfare effects of international subsidies designed to expedite the production of global public goods. It distinguishes between the impact subsidies exert on behaviour and the impact subsidies exert on welfare. Subsidies that encourage recipients to contribute to the provision of global public goods can be designed to maximize the welfare of donor countries. While these optimal subsidies achieve a Pareto efficient allocation of resources, all the efficiency gains are appropriated by donor countries. If equity is irrelevant, optimal subsidies are higher for high-income recipients than for low-income recipients.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)856-875
Number of pages20
JournalOxford Economic Papers
Volume65
Issue number4
Early online date14 Nov 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2013

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Subsidies
Resources
Low income
Income
Pareto
Efficient allocation
Efficiency gains
Welfare effects
Equity

Cite this

Helping others or helping oneself? International subsidies and the provision of global public goods. / Abul Naga, Ramses H. ; Jones, Philip.

In: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 65, No. 4, 10.2013, p. 856-875.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abul Naga, Ramses H. ; Jones, Philip. / Helping others or helping oneself? International subsidies and the provision of global public goods. In: Oxford Economic Papers. 2013 ; Vol. 65, No. 4. pp. 856-875.
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