Heterogeneous productivity in voluntary public good provision:: an experimental analysis

Erika Seki; Gerlinde  Fellner; Sabine Kroger; Yoshio Iida

Heterogeneous productivity in voluntary public good provision: an experimental analysis

Erika Seki, Gerlinde Fellner, Sabine Kroger, Yoshio Iida

Economics

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

This article experimentally examines voluntary contributions when group members’ marginal returns to the public good vary. The experiment implements two marginal return types, low and high, and uses the information that members have about the heterogeneity to identify the applied contribution norm. If agents are aware of the heterogeneity, contributions increase in general. However, high types contribute more than low types when contributions can be linked to the type of the donor but contribute less otherwise. Low types, on the other hand, contribute more than high types when group members are aware of the heterogeneity but contributions cannot be linked to types. Our results underline the importance of the information structure when persons with different abilities contribute to a joint project, as in the context of teamwork or charitable giving.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Bonn
Publisher	IZA Institute of Labor Economics
Number of pages	31
Publication status	Published - Mar 2011

Publication series

Name	IZA Discussion Papers
Publisher	IZA

Bibliographical note

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5556

We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany, and the Kyoto Sangyo University, Japan. Kröger gratefully acknowledges financial support by the FQRSC (127568). We thank Bettina Bartels and Håkan Fink for their research assistance. We are grateful to Charles Bellemare for providing helpful suggestions and his OX code. We also thank Nick Bardsley, Jeff Carpenter, Werner Güth, Euan Phimister, Eli Spiegelman and participants of the Beast workshop at the CREED in Amsterdam, the Austrian Economic Association meeting, the meeting of the Société canadienne de science économique, the M-BEES 2009 Maastricht and the North American, European, and World meeting of the ESA for helpful comments. Any errors are of course our own.

Keywords

public goods
voluntary contribution mechanism
heterogeneity
information
norms

Access to Document

http://ftp.iza.org/dp5556.pdfLicence: Unspecified

Cite this

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title = "Heterogeneous productivity in voluntary public good provision:: an experimental analysis",

abstract = "This article experimentally examines voluntary contributions when group members{\textquoteright} marginal returns to the public good vary. The experiment implements two marginal return types, low and high, and uses the information that members have about the heterogeneity to identify the applied contribution norm. If agents are aware of the heterogeneity, contributions increase in general. However, high types contribute more than low types when contributions can be linked to the type of the donor but contribute less otherwise. Low types, on the other hand, contribute more than high types when group members are aware of the heterogeneity but contributions cannot be linked to types. Our results underline the importance of the information structure when persons with different abilities contribute to a joint project, as in the context of teamwork or charitable giving. ",

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author = "Erika Seki and Gerlinde Fellner and Sabine Kroger and Yoshio Iida",

note = "IZA Discussion Paper No. 5556 We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany, and the Kyoto Sangyo University, Japan. Kr{\"o}ger gratefully acknowledges financial support by the FQRSC (127568). We thank Bettina Bartels and H{\aa}kan Fink for their research assistance. We are grateful to Charles Bellemare for providing helpful suggestions and his OX code. We also thank Nick Bardsley, Jeff Carpenter, Werner G{\"u}th, Euan Phimister, Eli Spiegelman and participants of the Beast workshop at the CREED in Amsterdam, the Austrian Economic Association meeting, the meeting of the Soci{\'e}t{\'e} canadienne de science {\'e}conomique, the M-BEES 2009 Maastricht and the North American, European, and World meeting of the ESA for helpful comments. Any errors are of course our own. ",

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N1 - IZA Discussion Paper No. 5556 We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany, and the Kyoto Sangyo University, Japan. Kröger gratefully acknowledges financial support by the FQRSC (127568). We thank Bettina Bartels and Håkan Fink for their research assistance. We are grateful to Charles Bellemare for providing helpful suggestions and his OX code. We also thank Nick Bardsley, Jeff Carpenter, Werner Güth, Euan Phimister, Eli Spiegelman and participants of the Beast workshop at the CREED in Amsterdam, the Austrian Economic Association meeting, the meeting of the Société canadienne de science économique, the M-BEES 2009 Maastricht and the North American, European, and World meeting of the ESA for helpful comments. Any errors are of course our own.

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AB - This article experimentally examines voluntary contributions when group members’ marginal returns to the public good vary. The experiment implements two marginal return types, low and high, and uses the information that members have about the heterogeneity to identify the applied contribution norm. If agents are aware of the heterogeneity, contributions increase in general. However, high types contribute more than low types when contributions can be linked to the type of the donor but contribute less otherwise. Low types, on the other hand, contribute more than high types when group members are aware of the heterogeneity but contributions cannot be linked to types. Our results underline the importance of the information structure when persons with different abilities contribute to a joint project, as in the context of teamwork or charitable giving.

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