Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

Luca Moretti (Corresponding Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract


Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)253-271
Number of pages19
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume49
Issue number2
Early online date22 Aug 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Fingerprint

Phenomenal Conservatism
Reflective
Justification
Internalist
Skepticism

Keywords

  • phenomenal conservatism
  • seemings
  • inferential justification
  • reflective awareness
  • inferential scepticism
  • Michael Huemer
  • entitlement theory
  • inferential seemings
  • Inferential justification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness. / Moretti, Luca (Corresponding Author).

In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2019, p. 253-271.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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