Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

Luca Moretti

doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1509192

Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

Luca Moretti^* (Corresponding Author)

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

4 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	253-271
Number of pages	19
Journal	Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume	49
Issue number	2
Early online date	22 Aug 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1509192
Publication status	Published - 2019

Keywords

phenomenal conservatism
seemings
inferential justification
reflective awareness
inferential scepticism
Michael Huemer
entitlement theory
inferential seemings
Inferential justification

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Accepted Manuscript
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Canadian Journal of Philosophy on 22 Aug 2018, available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1509192.
Accepted author manuscript, 263 KBLicence: Unspecified

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Cite this

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Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

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