Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge from Ignorance

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The principle of Counter-Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single-premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter-Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation of his view; or (ii) admit into his epistemology an IRI-specific novel brand of Gettier case; or (iii) abandon Counter-Closure.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)31-42
Number of pages12
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume93
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2012

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Ignorance
Closure
Invariantism
Intuition
Compatibility
Gettier Cases
Deduction
Epistemology

Cite this

Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge from Ignorance. / Luzzi, Federico Walter.

In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 1, 03.2012, p. 31-42.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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