Justification as 'would-be' knowledge

Aidan McGlynn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example that one's lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)361-376
Number of pages16
JournalEpisteme
Volume9
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2012

Fingerprint

Justification
Lottery
Conception
Martin Smith
Justified Belief
Epistemologists
Evidentials
Ticket

Cite this

Justification as 'would-be' knowledge. / McGlynn, Aidan .

In: Episteme, Vol. 9, No. 4, 12.2012, p. 361-376.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

McGlynn, Aidan . / Justification as 'would-be' knowledge. In: Episteme. 2012 ; Vol. 9, No. 4. pp. 361-376.
@article{d3b977b4a7e44f3da9da1bc6ff55e5d7,
title = "Justification as 'would-be' knowledge",
abstract = "In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example that one's lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.",
author = "Aidan McGlynn",
note = "Pre-print must state submitted for publication Pre-print must be removed upon acceptance for publication Pre-print on personal or departmental website or Institutional repository at time of submission Post-print on personal or departmental website at time of publication Post-print on Institutional or subject repository 12 months after publication Publisher copyright and source must be acknowledged Must link to publisher version Publisher's version/PDF must be used",
year = "2012",
month = "12",
doi = "10.1017/epi.2012.22",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "361--376",
journal = "Episteme",
issn = "1742-3600",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Justification as 'would-be' knowledge

AU - McGlynn, Aidan

N1 - Pre-print must state submitted for publication Pre-print must be removed upon acceptance for publication Pre-print on personal or departmental website or Institutional repository at time of submission Post-print on personal or departmental website at time of publication Post-print on Institutional or subject repository 12 months after publication Publisher copyright and source must be acknowledged Must link to publisher version Publisher's version/PDF must be used

PY - 2012/12

Y1 - 2012/12

N2 - In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example that one's lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.

AB - In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example that one's lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.

U2 - 10.1017/epi.2012.22

DO - 10.1017/epi.2012.22

M3 - Article

VL - 9

SP - 361

EP - 376

JO - Episteme

JF - Episteme

SN - 1742-3600

IS - 4

ER -