Knowing how to establish intellectualism

Daniele Sgaravatti, Elia Zardini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)217-261
Number of pages45
JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
Volume77
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2008

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Knowing-how
Intellectualism
Intellectualist
Uniformity
Closure Principle

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Sgaravatti, D., & Zardini, E. (2008). Knowing how to establish intellectualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 77, 217-261.

Knowing how to establish intellectualism. / Sgaravatti, Daniele; Zardini, Elia.

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 77, 01.10.2008, p. 217-261.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Sgaravatti, D & Zardini, E 2008, 'Knowing how to establish intellectualism', Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 77, pp. 217-261.
Sgaravatti D, Zardini E. Knowing how to establish intellectualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2008 Oct 1;77:217-261.
Sgaravatti, Daniele ; Zardini, Elia. / Knowing how to establish intellectualism. In: Grazer Philosophische Studien. 2008 ; Vol. 77. pp. 217-261.
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