Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 217-261 |
| Number of pages | 45 |
| Journal | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
| Volume | 77 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2008 |
Fingerprint
Cite this
Knowing how to establish intellectualism. / Sgaravatti, Daniele; Zardini, Elia.
In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 77, 01.10.2008, p. 217-261.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Knowing how to establish intellectualism
AU - Sgaravatti, Daniele
AU - Zardini, Elia
N1 - Publisher version cannot be used Published source must be acknowledged Must link to publisher version
PY - 2008/10/1
Y1 - 2008/10/1
N2 - In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion.
AB - In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion.
M3 - Article
VL - 77
SP - 217
EP - 261
JO - Grazer Philosophische Studien
JF - Grazer Philosophische Studien
SN - 0165-9227
ER -