Abstract
In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 217-261 |
| Number of pages | 45 |
| Journal | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
| Volume | 77 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2008 |
Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Knowing how to establish intellectualism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
Cite this
Sgaravatti, D., & Zardini, E. (2008). Knowing how to establish intellectualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 77, 217-261. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2008/00000077/00000001/art00010