Beall and Restall 2000, 2001 and 2006 advocate a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism, according to which there is not one true logic but many equally acceptable logical systems. They maintain that Logical Pluralism is compatible with monism about metaphysical modality, according to which there is just one correct logic of metaphysical modality. Wyatt 2004 contends that Logical Pluralism is incompatible with monism about metaphysical modality. We first suggest that if Wyatt were right, Logical Pluralism would be strongly implausible because it would get upside down a dependence relation that holds between metaphysics and logic of modality. We then argue that Logical Pluralism is prima facie compatible with monism about metaphysical modality.
Ciprotti, N., & Moretti, L. (2009). Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism about Metaphysical Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(2), 275-284. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802340626