Abstract
This article argues that family firms in which the top management team (TMT) is dominated by nonfamily managers are more likely to shift risk to employees through incentive pay schemes than family firms with TMTs dominated by family members. We also argue that this tendency is aggravated in firms of bigger size, as this condition makes nonfamily managers more vulnerable. We further note that differences between family‐ and non‐family‐dominated TMTs may lessen when the sales trend is negative. The analyses conducted on a sample of 219 family‐controlled car dealerships in Spain confirm our expectations.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 993-1007 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Human Resource Management |
Volume | 57 |
Issue number | 5 |
Early online date | 14 Aug 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2018 |
Bibliographical note
Research fundingSpanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Grant Number: ECO2013-48496-C4-2-R
BBVA Foundation research project
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Martin Larraza-Kintana acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness research project ECO2013-48496-C4-2-R. Jose Moyano-Fuentes acknowledges financial support by the BBVA Foundation research project obtained in the First Call of BBVA Foundation Grants for Research Projects (Socio Economics Area).