Managerial Family Ties and Employee Risk Bearing in Family Firms: Evidence from Spanish Car Dealers

Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Martin Larraza-Kintana* (Corresponding Author), Jose Moyano-Fuentes, Shainaz Firfiray

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article argues that family firms in which the top management team (TMT) is dominated by nonfamily managers are more likely to shift risk to employees through incentive pay schemes than family firms with TMTs dominated by family members. We also argue that this tendency is aggravated in firms of bigger size, as this condition makes nonfamily managers more vulnerable. We further note that differences between family‐ and non‐family‐dominated TMTs may lessen when the sales trend is negative. The analyses conducted on a sample of 219 family‐controlled car dealerships in Spain confirm our expectations.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)993-1007
Number of pages15
JournalHuman Resource Management
Volume57
Issue number5
Early online date14 Aug 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2018

Bibliographical note

Research funding
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Grant Number: ECO2013-48496-C4-2-R
BBVA Foundation research project

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Martin Larraza-Kintana acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness research project ECO2013-48496-C4-2-R. Jose Moyano-Fuentes acknowledges financial support by the BBVA Foundation research project obtained in the First Call of BBVA Foundation Grants for Research Projects (Socio Economics Area).

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