Melodies of Mind

Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures

David Alexander Stewart Duff

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Researchers in the field of cognitive poetics seeking historical endorsement of their work can turn with satisfaction to the statement by the poet-critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge that “Poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes” has “a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes” (Biographia 1: 9). Writing in 1815, not only does Coleridge affirm the fundamental premise of cognitive poetics-that poetry is a distinctive form of cognition, amenable to rational investigation-but also he does so in the strongest possible terms, claiming for poetry, even of the “wildest” kind, a logical rigor analogous to that of science. By “logic” we can understand here a system of thought governed by strict principles of validity. Coleridge was to write a major treatise on philosophical logic; his extension of the term here to poetry overturns a commonplace dating back to Plato that denies poetry the status of rational discourse and finds its distinguishing feature to lie in its breach of, or deviation from, the rules of thought and expression normally defined as “logical.” The grounds on which Coleridge offers this revaluation of poetry are not specified, but his statement echoes others in his writings that speak of poetry adhering to the “logic of passion” as distinct from the “logic of grammar” (Lectures 2: 427) or that claim (more cautiously) that verses, without being logic in themselves, “are, or ought to be, the envoys or representatives of that vital passion which is the practical cement of logic, and without which logic must remain inert” (Miscellaneous Criticism 277; cf. Table Talk 1: 126). For Coleridge, the cognitive power of poetry is not that of ratiocination, or abstract reasoning; what distinguishes poetic logic is its union of “thought” and “passion,” the “head” and the “heart” (Biographia 1: 25).1 In modern parlance, the “cognitive” in poetry is inseparable from the “affective,” and we have here a definition of poetry as a product of the “embodied” mind-a type of thinking that exposes the material texture of thought, its biological substratum or “cement.”
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCognition, Literature and History
EditorsMark J. Bruhn, Donald R. Wehrs
PublisherRoutledge
Pages17-38
Number of pages22
ISBN (Print)9780415722094, 0415722098
Publication statusPublished - 17 Dec 2013

Publication series

NameRoutledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature
PublisherRoutledge

Fingerprint

Poetry
Logic
Poetic Form
Melody
Thought
Passion
Cognitive Poetics
Substratum
Poetics
Ordinary Differential Equations
Causes
Commonplaces
Samuel Taylor Coleridge
Cognition
Affective
Fundamental
Treatise
Discourse
Grammar
Deviation

Cite this

Duff, D. A. S. (2013). Melodies of Mind: Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures. In M. J. Bruhn, & D. R. Wehrs (Eds.), Cognition, Literature and History (pp. 17-38). (Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature). Routledge.

Melodies of Mind : Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures. / Duff, David Alexander Stewart.

Cognition, Literature and History. ed. / Mark J. Bruhn; Donald R. Wehrs. Routledge, 2013. p. 17-38 (Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Duff, DAS 2013, Melodies of Mind: Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures. in MJ Bruhn & DR Wehrs (eds), Cognition, Literature and History. Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature, Routledge, pp. 17-38.
Duff DAS. Melodies of Mind: Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures. In Bruhn MJ, Wehrs DR, editors, Cognition, Literature and History. Routledge. 2013. p. 17-38. (Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature).
Duff, David Alexander Stewart. / Melodies of Mind : Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures. Cognition, Literature and History. editor / Mark J. Bruhn ; Donald R. Wehrs. Routledge, 2013. pp. 17-38 (Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature).
@inbook{5b9c07e754fc4dfa9c5fec466b537697,
title = "Melodies of Mind: Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures",
abstract = "Researchers in the field of cognitive poetics seeking historical endorsement of their work can turn with satisfaction to the statement by the poet-critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge that “Poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes” has “a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes” (Biographia 1: 9). Writing in 1815, not only does Coleridge affirm the fundamental premise of cognitive poetics-that poetry is a distinctive form of cognition, amenable to rational investigation-but also he does so in the strongest possible terms, claiming for poetry, even of the “wildest” kind, a logical rigor analogous to that of science. By “logic” we can understand here a system of thought governed by strict principles of validity. Coleridge was to write a major treatise on philosophical logic; his extension of the term here to poetry overturns a commonplace dating back to Plato that denies poetry the status of rational discourse and finds its distinguishing feature to lie in its breach of, or deviation from, the rules of thought and expression normally defined as “logical.” The grounds on which Coleridge offers this revaluation of poetry are not specified, but his statement echoes others in his writings that speak of poetry adhering to the “logic of passion” as distinct from the “logic of grammar” (Lectures 2: 427) or that claim (more cautiously) that verses, without being logic in themselves, “are, or ought to be, the envoys or representatives of that vital passion which is the practical cement of logic, and without which logic must remain inert” (Miscellaneous Criticism 277; cf. Table Talk 1: 126). For Coleridge, the cognitive power of poetry is not that of ratiocination, or abstract reasoning; what distinguishes poetic logic is its union of “thought” and “passion,” the “head” and the “heart” (Biographia 1: 25).1 In modern parlance, the “cognitive” in poetry is inseparable from the “affective,” and we have here a definition of poetry as a product of the “embodied” mind-a type of thinking that exposes the material texture of thought, its biological substratum or “cement.”",
author = "Duff, {David Alexander Stewart}",
year = "2013",
month = "12",
day = "17",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780415722094",
series = "Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature",
publisher = "Routledge",
pages = "17--38",
editor = "Bruhn, {Mark J.} and Wehrs, {Donald R.}",
booktitle = "Cognition, Literature and History",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Melodies of Mind

T2 - Poetic Forms as Cognitive Structures

AU - Duff, David Alexander Stewart

PY - 2013/12/17

Y1 - 2013/12/17

N2 - Researchers in the field of cognitive poetics seeking historical endorsement of their work can turn with satisfaction to the statement by the poet-critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge that “Poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes” has “a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes” (Biographia 1: 9). Writing in 1815, not only does Coleridge affirm the fundamental premise of cognitive poetics-that poetry is a distinctive form of cognition, amenable to rational investigation-but also he does so in the strongest possible terms, claiming for poetry, even of the “wildest” kind, a logical rigor analogous to that of science. By “logic” we can understand here a system of thought governed by strict principles of validity. Coleridge was to write a major treatise on philosophical logic; his extension of the term here to poetry overturns a commonplace dating back to Plato that denies poetry the status of rational discourse and finds its distinguishing feature to lie in its breach of, or deviation from, the rules of thought and expression normally defined as “logical.” The grounds on which Coleridge offers this revaluation of poetry are not specified, but his statement echoes others in his writings that speak of poetry adhering to the “logic of passion” as distinct from the “logic of grammar” (Lectures 2: 427) or that claim (more cautiously) that verses, without being logic in themselves, “are, or ought to be, the envoys or representatives of that vital passion which is the practical cement of logic, and without which logic must remain inert” (Miscellaneous Criticism 277; cf. Table Talk 1: 126). For Coleridge, the cognitive power of poetry is not that of ratiocination, or abstract reasoning; what distinguishes poetic logic is its union of “thought” and “passion,” the “head” and the “heart” (Biographia 1: 25).1 In modern parlance, the “cognitive” in poetry is inseparable from the “affective,” and we have here a definition of poetry as a product of the “embodied” mind-a type of thinking that exposes the material texture of thought, its biological substratum or “cement.”

AB - Researchers in the field of cognitive poetics seeking historical endorsement of their work can turn with satisfaction to the statement by the poet-critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge that “Poetry, even that of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes” has “a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes” (Biographia 1: 9). Writing in 1815, not only does Coleridge affirm the fundamental premise of cognitive poetics-that poetry is a distinctive form of cognition, amenable to rational investigation-but also he does so in the strongest possible terms, claiming for poetry, even of the “wildest” kind, a logical rigor analogous to that of science. By “logic” we can understand here a system of thought governed by strict principles of validity. Coleridge was to write a major treatise on philosophical logic; his extension of the term here to poetry overturns a commonplace dating back to Plato that denies poetry the status of rational discourse and finds its distinguishing feature to lie in its breach of, or deviation from, the rules of thought and expression normally defined as “logical.” The grounds on which Coleridge offers this revaluation of poetry are not specified, but his statement echoes others in his writings that speak of poetry adhering to the “logic of passion” as distinct from the “logic of grammar” (Lectures 2: 427) or that claim (more cautiously) that verses, without being logic in themselves, “are, or ought to be, the envoys or representatives of that vital passion which is the practical cement of logic, and without which logic must remain inert” (Miscellaneous Criticism 277; cf. Table Talk 1: 126). For Coleridge, the cognitive power of poetry is not that of ratiocination, or abstract reasoning; what distinguishes poetic logic is its union of “thought” and “passion,” the “head” and the “heart” (Biographia 1: 25).1 In modern parlance, the “cognitive” in poetry is inseparable from the “affective,” and we have here a definition of poetry as a product of the “embodied” mind-a type of thinking that exposes the material texture of thought, its biological substratum or “cement.”

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780415722094

SN - 0415722098

T3 - Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature

SP - 17

EP - 38

BT - Cognition, Literature and History

A2 - Bruhn, Mark J.

A2 - Wehrs, Donald R.

PB - Routledge

ER -