Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: the Best of Three Worlds

Francesco Berto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)
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Abstract

We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In Sect. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In Sects. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism—and their main troubles. In Sect. 6 we propose our MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 6.1); (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.3). In Sect. 7 we present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in Sect. 8 we have a look at how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-335
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume152
Issue number3
Early online date24 Nov 2009
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2011

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Fiction
Sect
Metaphysics
Paraphrase
Intuition
Discourse
Acceptability
Ontology
Entailment
Fictionalism
Privilege
Impossible Worlds
Operator
Formal Semantics

Keywords

  • Meinongianism
  • Impossible worlds
  • Fictional entities

Cite this

Modal Meinongianism and Fiction : the Best of Three Worlds. / Berto, Francesco.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 152, No. 3, 02.2011, p. 313-335.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Berto, Francesco. / Modal Meinongianism and Fiction : the Best of Three Worlds. In: Philosophical Studies. 2011 ; Vol. 152, No. 3. pp. 313-335.
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