Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects

Francesco Berto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) the claim that naïve Meinongianism allows one to prove that anything exists. In §3, we have impossible worlds enter the stage and provide independent justification for their use. In §4, we introduce our revised comprehension principle: our CP has no restriction on the (sets of) properties that can characterize objects, but parameterizes them to worlds, therefore having modality explicitly built into it. In §5, we propose an application of the MMM apparatus to fictional objects and defend the naturalness of our treatment against alternative approaches. Finally, in §6, we consider David Lewis’ notorious objection to impossibilia, and provide a reply to it by resorting to an ersatz account of worlds.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-218
Number of pages14
JournalMetaphysica: international journal for ontology and metaphysics
Volume9
Issue number2
Early online date6 Aug 2008
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2008

Fingerprint

Fiction
Metaphysics
Ontology
Impossible Worlds
Modality
Naturalness
David Lewis
Justification
Metaphysical
Criticism
Nave
Inconsistency

Keywords

  • impossible worlds
  • meinongianism
  • contradiction
  • fictional entities

Cite this

Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects. / Berto, Francesco.

In: Metaphysica: international journal for ontology and metaphysics, Vol. 9, No. 2, 10.2008, p. 205-218.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{7d4d27e7c3dc4f2ab866464970ac3ff6,
title = "Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects",
abstract = "Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) the claim that na{\"i}ve Meinongianism allows one to prove that anything exists. In §3, we have impossible worlds enter the stage and provide independent justification for their use. In §4, we introduce our revised comprehension principle: our CP has no restriction on the (sets of) properties that can characterize objects, but parameterizes them to worlds, therefore having modality explicitly built into it. In §5, we propose an application of the MMM apparatus to fictional objects and defend the naturalness of our treatment against alternative approaches. Finally, in §6, we consider David Lewis’ notorious objection to impossibilia, and provide a reply to it by resorting to an ersatz account of worlds.",
keywords = "impossible worlds , meinongianism , contradiction , fictional entities",
author = "Francesco Berto",
year = "2008",
month = "10",
doi = "10.1007/s12133-008-0033-z",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "205--218",
journal = "Metaphysica: international journal for ontology and metaphysics",
issn = "1437-2053",
publisher = "Walter de Gruyter GmbH",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects

AU - Berto, Francesco

PY - 2008/10

Y1 - 2008/10

N2 - Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) the claim that naïve Meinongianism allows one to prove that anything exists. In §3, we have impossible worlds enter the stage and provide independent justification for their use. In §4, we introduce our revised comprehension principle: our CP has no restriction on the (sets of) properties that can characterize objects, but parameterizes them to worlds, therefore having modality explicitly built into it. In §5, we propose an application of the MMM apparatus to fictional objects and defend the naturalness of our treatment against alternative approaches. Finally, in §6, we consider David Lewis’ notorious objection to impossibilia, and provide a reply to it by resorting to an ersatz account of worlds.

AB - Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) the claim that naïve Meinongianism allows one to prove that anything exists. In §3, we have impossible worlds enter the stage and provide independent justification for their use. In §4, we introduce our revised comprehension principle: our CP has no restriction on the (sets of) properties that can characterize objects, but parameterizes them to worlds, therefore having modality explicitly built into it. In §5, we propose an application of the MMM apparatus to fictional objects and defend the naturalness of our treatment against alternative approaches. Finally, in §6, we consider David Lewis’ notorious objection to impossibilia, and provide a reply to it by resorting to an ersatz account of worlds.

KW - impossible worlds

KW - meinongianism

KW - contradiction

KW - fictional entities

U2 - 10.1007/s12133-008-0033-z

DO - 10.1007/s12133-008-0033-z

M3 - Article

VL - 9

SP - 205

EP - 218

JO - Metaphysica: international journal for ontology and metaphysics

JF - Metaphysica: international journal for ontology and metaphysics

SN - 1437-2053

IS - 2

ER -