Abstract
Unlike standard models of choice, experimental evidence suggests that individuals avoid tradeoffs when choice problems are complex. I analyze the implications of consumers using noncompensatory choice heuristics in a simple Stackelberg game in which firms offer menus of multi-attribute alternatives and influence the attribute considered to be salient by consumers via marketing. I illustrate that there is a tight link between optimal menu design and marketing strategies in equilibrium and briefly discuss the choice-theoretic properties of the consumer's choice procedure.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 53-63 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Economic Theory Bulletin |
Volume | 2 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 7 Jan 2014 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2014 |
Keywords
- bounded rationality
- compensatory
- Stackelberg
- Noncompensatory choice heuristics