On coherent sets and the transmission of confirmation

Luca Moretti, Franz Dietrich

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which
the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as
usually, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members.
We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is “transmitted” to
any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according
to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s
measure. Our findings have implications for scientific methodology, as they provide a
formal rationale for the method of indirect confirmation and the method of confirming
theories by confirming their parts.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)403-424
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume72
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2005

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On coherent sets and the transmission of confirmation. / Moretti, Luca; Dietrich, Franz.

In: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 72, No. 3, 07.2005, p. 403-424.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Moretti, Luca ; Dietrich, Franz. / On coherent sets and the transmission of confirmation. In: Philosophy of Science. 2005 ; Vol. 72, No. 3. pp. 403-424.
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